Читать книгу Financial Cold War. A View of Sino-US Relations from the Financial Markets онлайн

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Melamed had long subscribed to the free market theories espoused by University of Chicago economics professor Milton Friedman. He saw that the end of Bretton Woods created the conditions for a market in foreign exchange rates, and immediately began to think about launching currency futures on the CME. However, many of the exchange's members at that time did not believe that financial futures could succeed and thought that the CME should stick to its traditional agricultural futures products. Indeed, the New York Produce Exchange had renamed itself the International Commerce Exchange in April 1970 and launched currency contracts targeted at small-time speculators, but these had not found success. Nevertheless, that had been before Nixon's August 1971 bombshell and Melamed was convinced that that crucial development would enable global currency futures to take off.

To build credibility for his cause, he enlisted Friedman's help. Over breakfast at the Waldorf Astoria in November 1971, Melamed explained his idea to the famed economist. Friedman agreed that, with the suspension of the Bretton Woods Agreement, conditions were ripe for developing a market in currency futures. Melamed asked Friedman if he would be willing to put his opinion in writing, to which the economist answered: ‘Yes, but I am a capitalist’. For a fee of $7,500, Friedman agreed to write a feasibility study on ‘The Need for a Futures Market in Currency’ and submitted it to the CME in December 1971. With this endorsement, Melamed launched the International Monetary Market (IMM) in May 1972 and began offering futures contracts on seven currencies against the US dollar.ssss1 The currency futures achieved rapid success and, with the backing of Friedman's academic prestige, the IMM received regulatory support for the launch of interest rate futures on US Treasury bills in 1975.