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For many generations in England and in America it was believed that the writ of habeas corpus, justly esteemed the great bulwark of personal liberty, had its direct guaranty or at least its antecedent in Magna Carta. Such was the contention of counsel in the Five Knights case of 1627, and such was the declaration of the Petition of Right of 1628. This view is now being challenged on the ground that the exact procedure subsequently developed was not provided for in Magna Carta and was not in the minds of its authors. Even if this be so, the underlying principle of chapter thirty-six and its promise that the writ of inquisition should be freely "granted, and never denied" naturally led in time, after the passing of trial by combat, to the right of speedy inquisition by grand jury and trial by petit jury. At all events, the principle of the writ of habeas corpus was for centuries assumed to be embodied in Magna Carta.

Professor Dicey lecturing at Oxford on "The Law of the Constitution" has well remarked that, although the English Habeas Corpus acts declare no principle and define no rights, they are for practical purposes worth a hundred constitutional articles guaranteeing individual liberty. As in England, so with us. Without the writ of habeas corpus there would be no liberty worthy of the name and no rights of personal freedom of any practical value. We have only to read the leading cases in our courts to realize how great a part the writ has played and still plays in securing and rendering effective the fundamental principles of American liberty.