Читать книгу The War History of the 1st/ 4th Battalion, 1914-1918. The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment онлайн

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About 11 p.m. there was a slackening of the German fire, both artillery and rifle. The German artillery fire had been directed chiefly against our supports and reserves, and was particularly violent at L 8. Some of our wounded had been collected there, and were looked after there all night by Sergeant-Major Farnworth.

By this time, in the front line, a machine gun had been placed in position about L 10. The trench junction there had been blocked by sandbags. It was at this point (L 10) that the Scottish Rifles were in touch with us. It was found impossible, because of lack of material, to block the further trench (X 7), and accordingly the line we held in the ditch was bent back to the right to protect that flank. The line was a bad one. There was a conference of Officers held by Major Nickson. Both flanks were in the air. We were not in touch with the 7th Division, and enfilade rifle fire was coming from the right flank, though fairly weak. The ditch was waterlogged, and too wide in places and clearly marked by the row of pollard willows. Spades and picks and sandbags were lacking. There were no bombs left, and no bombers. (There were two advanced bomb reserves of 1,000 bombs each near L 8, but no one knew where these were. The bombers sent to reinforce the original party were shelled heavily on the road to the reserve trenches, and out of 33 only five were unwounded.) Impossible to entrench ditch. Therefore proposed line about 20 yards back in the open. This meant beginning afresh without tools. Men too crowded in line. There were no Verey lights. Artillery support had ceased about 8 45 because of uncertainty as to the actual position of the attacking Battalions. Major Nickson sent back word to Major Foley explaining this and asking for instructions. In the meantime the German counter-attack began, and prevented instructions arriving.