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The meeting of newly elected American President John F. Kennedy with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna on June 3 and 4, 1961, coincided with this tense situation. Khrushchev pushed for the signing of a peace treaty and threatened once again to enforce this on the GDR if America was not prepared to agree to his demands. A separate peace treaty would also be offered to West Germany. Such a treaty would mean the end of the war and nobody would be forced to surrender. This would concern the entire law of occupation as well as access to Berlin including the airlift. Khrushchev threatened that any violation of GDR ruling would be classified as a declaration of war.
Kennedy, on the other hand, made it clear that Khrushchev’s proposal would deprive the United States of its legal rights to be present in Berlin and thus of its ability to fulfil its obligations to the city’s two million residents. This would shake the credibility and confidence of the partners in the United States. Therefore, due to his political responsibility, he could not approve this. It was not about Berlin, it was about the whole of western Europe as well as U.S. state security, to which Berlin was of crucial strategical importance. Kennedy wanted to maintain the balance of power in the post-war order as he thought any shift would be detrimental. Both representatives of the major powers left Vienna without reaching agreement. In an address to the nation on July 25th, 1961, Kennedy once again stated the principles that applied to West Berlin and would be defended by the United States. Kennedy once again named the “Three Essentials” directing the U.S. course of action in West Berlin: 1) the right of western Allies to be present in Berlin, 2) the right to free access to the city, 3) securing the livelihood of West Berlin and its citizens. These principles were publicized worldwide in a large-scale information campaign. Kennedy formulated them specifically for West Berlin and not the whole of the city, as the special status would have implied. This position signalled to the Soviet Union that Kennedy respected its original victors’ rights in its sector and accepted border closure in the interest of avoiding military confrontation.15