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In the earlier statement of the pragmatic maxim,^[13] Peirce emphasized the consequences for conduct that follow from the acceptance or rejection of an idea; but the stoical maxim that the end of man is action did not appeal to him as much at sixty as it did at thirty.^[14] Naturally also Peirce could not follow the development of pragmatism by Wm. James who, like almost all modern psychologists, was a thorough nominalist and always emphasized particular sensible experience.^[15] It seemed to Peirce that such emphasis on particular experiences endangered the principle of continuity which in the hands of men like Weierstrass had reformed modern mathematics. For this reason he began to call his own doctrine pragmaticism, a sufficiently unattractive name, he thought, to save it from kidnappers and from popularity. He never, however, abandoned the principle of pragmatism, that the meaning of an idea is clarified (because constituted) by its conceivable experimental consequences. Indeed, if we want to clarify the meaning of the idea of pragmatism, let us apply the pragmatic test to it. What will be the effect of accepting it? Obviously it will be to develop certain general ideas or habits of looking at things.