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Coercitio implies summary jurisdiction; and the infliction of fines beyond a certain limit, scourging, or death subjected a magistrate to the provocatio, and therefore made him a partner in a trial before a popular assembly. Hence the judicial power of the tribune, also a necessary consequence of his power of veto. Undoubtedly when the office was created this consequence was not foreseen. When it was found to be a necessary accompaniment of the tribunician power, tradition tells us that it was questioned by the Patricians. The historically worthless but typical trial of C. Marcius Coriolanus in 491 B.C. elicited a protest that the jus of the tribunes extended only to Plebeians.[366] The protest was idle, for the jus auxilii could not exist without the jus poenae against its violators. The violation of plebeian rights which was thus met by tribunician coercion and jurisdiction, was always an infringement of the safety or dignity of the tribune himself. Even the infliction of wrong on an individual through the violation of the tribune’s decree was a wrong done to the Plebs through him; it was not held to affect the rest of the community; hence the not unnatural belief of our annalists that, when the tribune pronounced a sentence against which there was an appeal, he brought the matter before the assembly of the Plebs.