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There have been advocates who regard such a course as quixotic. The late Joshua Williams was asked whether, if an advocate knows of a decided case in point against him which he has reason to believe is not known to the other side, he is bound to reveal it, and gave it as his opinion that “in principle this is no part of his duty as an advocate.” It must be remembered that this opinion was given when a host of cases were decided against their merits on purely technical points of law; but there is no doubt what the practice ought to be, and what among English advocates the practice is.

If an advocate knows the law to be x, it is not honest to lead the court to believe that it is y. Whether the advocate does this by directly mis-stating the law, or by deliberately omitting to state it fully within the means of his knowledge, it is equally without excuse, and dims the lamp of honesty.

For the advocate must remember that he is not only the servant of the client, but the friend of the court, and honesty is as essential to true friendship as it is to sound advocacy.