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He had given a definition of reason: “The result of the simultaneous action of all the intellectual faculties.”[37] In the same way he defined will to be “the result of the simultaneous action of the superior intellectual faculties.”[38] But Gall always deceives himself; for reason and will are not results—they are powers, and primary powers of thought.

Gall, in a manner equally singular, defines moral liberty or free will.

“Moral liberty,” says he, “is nothing more than the faculty of being determined, and of determining under motive.”[39] Not so: liberty is precisely the power to determine against all motive. Locke well defined liberty as power: to be determined, is to allow one’s self to be determined—that is, to obey.

Gall says again, “Unlimited liberty supposes not only that man governs himself independently of all law, but that he is the creator of his own nature.”[40] Not at all; it supposes that he may have choice—and in fact he does choose.

Lastly, Gall says, “A phenomenon such as that of absolute liberty, would be a phenomenon occurring without any cause whatever.”[41] Why without cause? The cause is in the power of choosing—and this power is a fact.