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It is of interest in this connection to notice the fact that when Arnold, in his first dash up Lake Champlain, found that Warner had anticipated his projected capture of Crown Point, as Allen had that of Ticonderoga, he was greatly offended, usurped command of that post and of a few vessels which he styled his “Navy,” and upon finding that his assumption of authority was neither sanctioned by Massachusetts nor Connecticut, discharged his force and returned to Cambridge in anger. This same navy, however, chiefly constructed under his skilful and energetic direction, won several brilliant successes and certainly postponed movements from Canada southward, for many months.

Eventually a formal expedition was authorized against Montreal, and Generals Schuyler and Montgomery were assigned to its command. This force, consisting of three thousand men, was ordered to rendezvous during the month of August at Ticonderoga, where Allen and Warner also joined it.

During the same month a committee from Congress visited Washington at Cambridge, and persuaded him to send a second army to Canada, via the Kennebec river, to capture Quebec. Existing conditions seemed to warrant these demonstrations which, under other circumstances, might have proved fatal to success at Boston. The theory upon which Washington concurred in the action of Congress is worthy of notice, in estimating his character as a soldier. He understood that the suddenness of the resistance at Lexington, and the comparatively “drawn game” between the patriots and British regulars at Breed’s Hill, would involve on the part of the British government much time and great outlay of money, in order to send to America an adequate force for aggressive action upon any extended scale; and that the control of New York and the southern coast cities must be of vastly more importance than to harass the scattered settlements adjoining Canada. Inasmuch, however, as New York and New England seemed to stake the safety of their northern frontier upon operations northward, while Quebec and Montreal were almost destitute of regular troops, and the season of the year would prevent British reënforcements by sea, it might prove to be the best opportunity to test the sentiment of the Canadian people themselves as to their readiness to make common cause against the Crown. If reported professions could be realized, the north would be permanently protected.