Читать книгу Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation. Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works, vol. II., with Preface by Bernard Bosanquet онлайн

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85. So far as Austin means that a fully developed state implies a determinate supreme source of law, he is right as against Rousseau

86. But if sovereign power = the aggregate influences which really make the people obedient, it must be sought in the 'general will'

87. Such power need not be 'sovereign' in the narrower sense, and may coexist with a separate coercive power which is 'sovereign'

88. This has been the case in ancient despotisms, and in the modern empires of the East

89. So in states under foreign dominion, which retain a national life, the technical sovereign is not the law-making and law-maintaining power

90. Under the Roman Empire, in British India, in Russia, where the technical is also the real sovereign, its strength rests in different degrees on the general will

91. Thus the answer to question (1) depends on the sense of 'sovereign.' If it = a power which guarantees equal rights, it is implied in every 'political' society

92. But (a) it need not be the supreme coercive power, and (b) if it is so, it is not because it is so that it commands habitual obedience