Читать книгу Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) онлайн

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On the contrary, Things which are opposed in idea, are themselves opposed to each other. But the idea of "one" consists in indivisibility; and the idea of "multitude" contains division. Therefore "one" and "many" are opposed to each other.

I answer that, "One" is opposed to "many," but in various ways. The one which is the principle of number is opposed to multitude which is number, as the measure is to the thing measured. For "one" implies the idea of a primary measure; and number is multitude measured by one, as is clear from Metaph. x. But the one which is convertible with being is opposed to multitude by way of privation; as the undivided is to the thing divided.

Reply Obj. 1: No privation entirely takes away the being of a thing, inasmuch as privation means "negation in the subject," according to the Philosopher (Categor. viii). Nevertheless every privation takes away some being; and so in being, by reason of its universality, the privation of being has its foundation in being; which is not the case in privations of special forms, as of sight, or of whiteness and the like. And what applies to being applies also to one and to good, which are convertible with being, for the privation of good is founded in some good; likewise the removal of unity is founded in some one thing. Hence it happens that multitude is some one thing; and evil is some good thing, and non-being is some kind of being. Nevertheless, opposite is not predicated of opposite; forasmuch as one is absolute, and the other is relative; for what is relative being (as a potentiality) is non-being absolutely, i.e. actually; or what is absolute being in the genus of substance is non-being relatively as regards some accidental being. In the same way, what is relatively good is absolutely bad, or vice versa; likewise what is absolutely one is relatively many, and vice versa.