Читать книгу Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) онлайн

154 страница из 465

Whether God Is Supremely One?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not supremely one. For "one" is so called from the privation of division. But privation cannot be greater or less. Therefore God is not more "one" than other things which are called "one."

Obj. 2: Further, nothing seems to be more indivisible than what is actually and potentially indivisible; such as a point and unity. But a thing is said to be more "one" according as it is indivisible. Therefore God is not more one than unity is one and a point is one.

Obj. 3: Further, what is essentially good is supremely good. Therefore what is essentially one is supremely one. But every being is essentially one, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv). Therefore every being is supremely one; and therefore God is not one more than any other being is one.

On the contrary, Bernard says (De Consid. v): "Among all things called one, the unity of the Divine Trinity holds the first place."

I answer that, Since one is an undivided being, if anything is supremely one it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided. Now both of these belong to God. For He is supremely being, inasmuch as His being is not determined by any nature to which it is adjoined; since He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined. But He is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is divided neither actually nor potentially, by any mode of division; since He is altogether simple, as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 7). Hence it is manifest that God is one in the supreme degree.