Читать книгу A Companion to the Hellenistic and Roman Near East онлайн

71 страница из 236

The Euphrates marked the edge of the Parthian Empire; neither Sulla’s meeting with the Parthian ambassador of Mithridates II (92 BCE), nor the agreement between Lucullus and Phraates III (70 BCE), renewed in 66 BCE by Pompey and the Parthian leaders, challenged this line of demarcation that was implicitly acknowledged by all. Yet the tension between the two empires remained strong, as neither had renounced the possibility of expanding beyond the line. Although the precise reasons are unknown, but perhaps due to the fear of a Parthian offensive, the Senate entrusted Aulus Gabinius, governor of Syria (57–55 BCE), with the mission of preparing to wage war against them. Although he started a campaign in 55 BCE, Gabinius quickly abandoned this objective in order to reinstate Ptolemy XII to his throne in Alexandria in exchange for a large sum of money. The mission to fight against the Parthians was therefore taken up by his successor in charge of Syria, Marcus Licinius Crassus, named proconsul for five years. Contrary to the theory that for a long time successfully maligned the triumvirate with hostile propaganda, Crassus did not undertake his expedition against the Parthians without orders from the Senate. Nevertheless, underprepared and poorly led, this expedition ended in disaster at Carrhae-Harran (53 BCE) where the principal leaders lost their lives along with 20,000 Roman soldiers, not counting the many prisoners.