Читать книгу Financial Cold War. A View of Sino-US Relations from the Financial Markets онлайн

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Richard Milhous Nixon's most celebrated foreign policy achievement was the initiation of Sino-US rapprochement, the highlight of which was his February 1972 visit to China to meet with Chairman Mao Zedong (毛泽东). This diplomatic masterstroke fundamentally reshaped the Cold War balance of power in America's favour. It forced the Soviet leadership to the negotiating table on détente and paved the way for America's exit from a demoralising Vietnam War. For US allies in East Asia though, this sudden and unexpected development following Nixon's enunciation of the Guam Doctrine in 1969 was unsettling.ssss1 For none was it more so than Japan, whose government received only two hours' notice before Nixon's 15 July 1971 announcement that Henry Kissinger had made a clandestine visit to China to meet with Zhou Enlai (周恩来). This was one of a series of US diplomatic blows to Satō Eisaku's government that the Japanese media dubbed the Niksonu Shokku, or ‘Nixon Shocks’. However, it was not just in the realm of foreign policy that the 37^th president was to create long-lasting tremors. The financial shocks he delivered also left a profound legacy in global capital markets.