Читать книгу Financial Cold War. A View of Sino-US Relations from the Financial Markets онлайн

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In the face of economic pressures and speculative attacks on the dollar, Nixon went on national television on 15 August 1971. In the grainy analogue broadcast, he announced in a calm tone that the US was suspending the dollar's convertibility to gold. In the height of irony, he told viewers that ‘The effect of this action … will be to stabilise the dollar’.ssss1 At the same time, he announced a 90-day wage price freeze to combat inflation and demonstrate to other countries that the US was taking its share of pain, as well as a temporary 10 percent import surcharge to protect US manufacturers from near-term currency fluctuations.

Nixon's announcement stunned the world. The President hadn't even forewarned the IMF. The US subsequently met with the other Group of 10 (G-10) countries at the Smithsonian Institute in Washington DC in December that year and, following two days of tough negotiations, announced that the dollar would, on average, be devalued by 10 percent, while the Deutschmark was revalued upwards by 13.6 percent and the yen by 16.9 percent. The dollar was pegged at $38 per ounce of gold and the permitted fluctuation from the new parities was widened to 2.25 percent. However, the Smithsonian Agreement did not hold. Nixon was not interested in being tethered to the new parities and, following his resounding election victory over George McGovern, attempts by the G-10 to re-establish a system of fixed parities were abandoned in 1973. The dollar would, henceforth, be a freely floating fiat currency without any fixed reference to gold or any other asset.