Читать книгу Financial Cold War. A View of Sino-US Relations from the Financial Markets онлайн

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China had been pursuing gradual market and political reforms since Deng had come to power in 1978 and announced his ‘reform and opening up’ (改革开放) policies. In the wake of Tiananmen, however, the Chinese government significantly accelerated market reforms, or what China's leadership has called ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ (中国特色社会主义), while political reforms were for the most part shelved.

As China embarked upon on its own unique path of reform and growth, Chinese policymakers were able to draw on lessons learned from the West. They also paid close attention to developments in Russia in the years following the fall of communism, as well as to Japan's slump into economic stagnation following the end of the Japanese economic miracle. The resulting improvement in living standards for the Chinese population was unprecedented in history, with hundreds of millions of people being lifted from extreme poverty into the middle class within a generation.

The economic policies China has pursued since the 1990s have led to growth that has far exceeded the expectations of their original architects. Following its accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001, China's export growth accelerated rapidly, and the country became the factory of the world. For some in the developed West, this provided great benefits, including low inflation, access to reasonably priced consumer goods and, increasingly, a huge new market for goods and services. For others, competition from China has led to displacement, wage stagnation and unemployment. Some, including many in the US, argue that China has engaged in unfair trade practices, such as suppressing the value of its currency to make its exports more competitive.ssss1 Others argue that it is America's high cost structure that has made its exports uncompetitive, so it has only itself to blame.ssss1 The truth, as is often the case, lies somewhere in the middle.